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[核武器] DIA局长论中国核力量发展

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kktt 发表于 2019-6-5 09:42 | 显示全部楼层 |阅读模式

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Russian and Chinese Nuclear Modernization Trends
Remarks at the Hudson Institute
May 29, 2019

Lt. Gen. Robert P. Ashley, Jr.
Director Defense Intelligence Agency

AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY

First, let me thank the Hudson Institute for hosting this event and the opportunity to speak about Russian and Chinese nuclear modernization trends.  With the return of great power competition, nuclear capabilities are again at the forefront of critical work for the Intelligence Community. For the Defense Intelligence Agency this is why we exist, our core mission is to understand foreign military capabilities and provide decision advantage to our senior leadership.

So let me first begin with Russia.

After working together for decades to achieve real nuclear reductions, Russia is upgrading the capacity of its nuclear forces. We assess its overall nuclear stockpile is likely to grow significantly over the next decade.

This assessed growth is primarily driven by a significant projected increase in the number of Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons. Russia is adding new military capabilities to its existing stockpile of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, including those employable by ships, aircraft, and ground forces. These nuclear warheads include theater- and tactical-range systems that Russia relies on to deter and defeat NATO or China in a conflict.     

Russia’s stockpile of non-strategic nuclear weapons—already large and diverse and is being modernized with an eye towards greater accuracy, longer ranges, and lower yields to suit their potential warfighting role.

We assess Russia to have dozens of these systems already deployed or in development. They include, but are not limited to: short- and close-range ballistic missiles, ground-launched cruise missiles, including the 9M729 missile, which the U.S. Government determined violates the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces or INF Treaty, as well as antiship and antisubmarine missiles, torpedoes, and depth charges.

For comparison, the United States currently has a single non-strategic nuclear weapons system: the B-61 gravity bomb.

We assess Russia possesses up to 2,000 such non-strategic nuclear warheads not covered by the New Start Treaty and because of a lack of Russian transparency we have  uncertainty in our understanding of the scope and disposition of their stockpile.

Accurately accounting for these non-strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems is not only complicated by a lack of transparency but their dual-capable nature. Most Russian systems lack externally distinguishing features that would allow observers to differentiate between conventional and nuclear variants.

Where limits or reductions have existed, such as with the INF Treaty or the 1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, the United States assesses that Russia has not fulfilled them. This is exemplified by the development of the 9M729 ground launched cruise missile.  

By 2015, Russia had completed a comprehensive flight test program consisting of multiple tests of the 9M729 missile from both fixed and mobile launchers that appeared to be purposefully designed to disguise the true nature of their testing activity, as well as the true capacity of the missile.

While compliance determinations such as the INF Treaty are ultimately made by the U.S. interagency policy community, I want to be clear about the role of the Intelligence Community.  It is the job of the Intelligence Community (IC) to analyze those activities that have implications for a country’s international obligations.  The IC does not use the word compliance but rather characterizes actions as “inconsistent” with the intent of such treaties and uses those assessments to help inform the interagency process.

From an interagency standpoint, the U.S. has determined Russia’s actions have strained other key pillars of arms control architecture, including the Chemical Weapons Convention, Open Skies Treaty, the Vienna Document, and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

In addition to the anticipated growth in non-strategic nuclear weapons, Russia claims to be developing new warhead designs for strategic systems,  such as new high-yield and earth-penetrating warheads  to attack hardened military targets like U.S., Allied, and Chinese command and control facilities.

Russia’s development of new warhead designs and overall stockpile management efforts have been enhanced by its approach to nuclear testing. The United States believes that Russia probably is not adhering to its nuclear testing moratorium in a manner consistent with the “zero-yield” standard.  

Our understanding of nuclear weapon development leads us to believe Russia’s testing activities would help it to improve its nuclear weapons capabilities. The United States, by contrast, has forgone such benefits by upholding a “zero-yield” standard.

Russia’s ongoing, comprehensive build-up in both its strategic and nonstrategic nuclear forces is made possible by sustained and prioritized investments in its nuclear weapons development and production infrastructure. By 2013, Rosatom had modernized dozens of its experimental facilities, and Rosatom’s budget has increased roughly 30 percent in real terms from 2010 to 2018 to support these and other operations.  

In contrast to the United States, during the past decade, Russia has improved and expanded its production complex, which has the capacity to process thousands of warheads annually.

An increase in its overall nuclear warhead stockpile is not the only source of concern stemming from Russia’s broad-based nuclear modernization program.

Within the confines of the New START Treaty, Russia claims its overhaul of its strategic rocket forces is roughly 70% complete. Every leg of Russia’s triad is being modernized and Russia is fielding new strategic systems, including road-mobile and silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), a submarine-launched ballistic missile, an upgraded strategic nuclear bomber, and a strategic air-launched cruise missile.   

Many of these new systems have a greater warhead delivery capacity than the systems they are replacing.  For example, Russia’s aging SS-25 road-mobile ICBM carries a single nuclear warhead, while its replacement—the SS-27—can carry multiple warheads, providing Russia significant capability to “upload” additional warheads onto its strategic delivery systems. The SS-18—Russia’s aging heavy ICBM—carries up to 10 nuclear warheads, while the Russian president claims the Sarmat—its replacement—will carry even more warheads or Russia’s new nuclear-armed “Avanguard” hypersonic glide vehicle.

While we assess Russia is currently adhering to the New START Treaty limits on deployed warheads, this upload capacity will give Russia the ability to increase the number of deployed warheads in a time of crisis.

Russia is also pursuing novel nuclear delivery systems that create a strategic challenge for the U.S. and which are difficult to manage under current arms control agreements.   

In March 2018, President Putin unveiled these systems, which include: an intercontinental-range, nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed underwater drone; a nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed intercontinental-range cruise missile; and an air-launched ballistic missile.  Russia also continues to modernize its existing automated nuclear command and control launch system, known as “Perimeter.”

President Putin’s high-profile announcement in March 2018 makes clear that Russia is continuing to prioritize investment in its nuclear forces, even at a time of domestic budgetary constraints.

These new nuclear capabilities have come at the expense of other Russian defense priorities, such as the development of a new aircraft carrier, because Russia sees its nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantor of the country’s survival, perceives a warfighting role for their use, and directs its scarce resources to its nuclear modernization effort.  

These quantitative and qualitative improvements to Russia’s nuclear arsenal have security implications for the United States and our allies.  Russia’s large and diverse stockpile facilitates a doctrine that envisions the potential coercive use of nuclear weapons.

Russia assesses that the threat of nuclear escalation or actual first use of nuclear weapons would serve to “de-escalate” a conflict on terms favorable to Russia.  Russian defense officials have spoken publicly about “de-escalating” a conflict through limited nuclear use and it is a fact that the Russian military has prepared plans and is well trained to transition rapidly to nuclear use in order to compel an end to a conventional conflict. Russia’s perception that nuclear use could terminate a conflict on terms favorable to Russia increases the prospect for miscalculation.

Let me now turn to China as Russia is not the United States’ only strategic competitor expanding its nuclear capability.   

Over the next decade, China is likely to at least double the size of its nuclear stockpile in the course of implementing the most rapid expansion and diversification of its nuclear arsenal in China’s history. Last year, China launched more ballistic missiles for testing and training than the rest of the world combined. We expect this modernization to continue and this trajectory is consistent with  Chinese President Xi’s vision for China’s military, which he laid out at the 19th Party Congress and stated that China’s military will be “fully transformed into a first tier force” by 2050.

China has developed a new road-mobile ICBM, a new multi-warhead version of its silo-based ICBM, and a new submarine-launched ballistic missile. With its announcement of a new nuclear-capable strategic bomber, China will soon field their own nuclear triad, demonstrating China’s commitment to expanding the role and centrality of nuclear forces in Beijing’s military aspirations. And like Russia, China is also working to field nuclear, theater-range precision-strike systems. While China’s overall arsenal is assessed to be much smaller than Russia’s does not make this trend any less concerning.

Based on the United States’ experience in developing nuclear weapons, we understand the efforts required for China’s substantive and rapid expansion in their nuclear weapons program and capabilities.

US Government information indicates that China is possibly preparing to operate its test site year-round, a development that speaks directly to China’s growing goals for its nuclear forces. Further, China continues to use explosive containment chambers at its nuclear test site and Chinese leaders previously joined Russia in watering down language in a P5 statement that would have affirmed a uniform understanding of “zero-yield” testing. The combination of these facts and China’s lack of transparency on their nuclear testing activities raise questions as to whether China could achieve such progress without activities inconsistent with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

It is also important to note that—in addition to modernizing their nuclear forces—China and Russia are also pursuing emerging technologies that have the potential to revolutionize undersea warfare and challenge U.S. superiority in the maritime domain.

As our annual threat assessments, national security, and defense strategies have highlighted, the resurgence of great power competition is a geopolitical reality. It is the mindset Russia and China have embraced, the mindset that is guiding their approach to nuclear modernization and investment. Nuclear weapons remain central to Russia and China’s military plans and intentions and therefore remain a critical area of analysis for the Defense Intelligence Agency to provide our senior leadership with decision advantage.   

https://www.dia.mil/News/Speeche ... dernization-trends/


折翅的鹰 发表于 2019-6-5 10:02 | 显示全部楼层
老大,能不能翻译一下,我觉得像看天书一样
supsauce 发表于 2019-6-5 10:21 | 显示全部楼层
折翅的鹰 发表于 2019-6-5 10:02
老大,能不能翻译一下,我觉得像看天书一样

中国未来十年将会翻倍核武库;全年运行test site(指什么?);将要建立三位一体;积极追求颠覆美国水下优势;zero-yield testing可能绕过核试验条约
 楼主| kktt 发表于 2019-6-5 10:36 | 显示全部楼层
supsauce 发表于 2019-6-5 10:21
中国未来十年将会翻倍核武库;全年运行test site(指什么?);将要建立三位一体;积极追求颠覆美国水下 ...

test site:试验场,这里指的应该是导弹试验基地
c3po1994 发表于 2019-6-5 10:44 | 显示全部楼层
发射导弹次数并不能说明什么,如果试验之后仍然是缓慢装备,对中国未来增加核武库的指责就是莫须有的。现在来看,军队对核武器的态度仍旧是“纸老虎”,有则够用,不必真用
东方红 发表于 2019-6-5 11:01 来自航空航天港手机版! | 显示全部楼层
折翅的鹰 发表于 2019-6-5 10:02
老大,能不能翻译一下,我觉得像看天书一样

原文较长,大意如下:

俄罗斯战术核武库正在扩大,大约有2000枚战术核弹头,战术核武器朝着远射程高精度低当量方向发展,尤其是9M729陆基巡航导弹,以对付北约和中国。
俄罗斯战略核武库已经更新了大约70%,发展了新的陆基机动发射弹道导弹,潜地弹道导弹,空射巡航导弹。新的载具携带弹头的数量要比旧载具多,所以在危急时刻可以大大扩增弹头数量。
所有这些都对美国及其盟友的安全造成了威胁。

预计未来十年,中国战略核力量会翻番,这一速度是前所未有的。中国已经开发出新的陆基机动洲际弹道导弹,新的井射多弹头洲际弹道导弹,新的潜地弹道导弹,还有改进型轰炸机,即将实现战略核力量的三位一体化。
同时也在发展战术核武器,尽管跟俄罗斯相比,规模要小的多,但仍然不可忽视。

——不得不说,美国人头脑还是很清醒的。
3431 发表于 2019-6-5 12:53 | 显示全部楼层
东方红 发表于 2019-6-5 11:01
原文较长,大意如下:

俄罗斯战术核武库正在扩大,大约有2000枚战术核弹头,战术核武器朝着远射程高精 ...

有些话是有目的性的 没事把核试验的话挑出来说 从近年来的情况看或许是美国在为退出条约做准备。
3431 发表于 2019-6-5 12:55 | 显示全部楼层
supsauce 发表于 2019-6-5 10:21
中国未来十年将会翻倍核武库;全年运行test site(指什么?);将要建立三位一体;积极追求颠覆美国水下 ...

也就是达到500多枚 其实也就是勉强够用。
zhutou6 发表于 2019-6-5 12:57 | 显示全部楼层
东方红 发表于 2019-6-5 11:01
原文较长,大意如下:

俄罗斯战术核武库正在扩大,大约有2000枚战术核弹头,战术核武器朝着远射程高精 ...

FAS的Hans M. Kristensen看不下去了,亲自出马打脸DIA一贯吹牛扯淡的历史业绩...
请问DIA拿了那么多经费,到底有哪次预测准过?(下图红点)

ChinaEstimates.png

supsauce 发表于 2019-6-5 12:58 来自航空航天港手机版! | 显示全部楼层
3431 发表于 2019-6-5 12:55
也就是达到500多枚 其实也就是勉强够用。

如果整体翻倍的话能打到美国的可能是现在的好几倍。确实也就是刚好勉强够用
zhutou6 发表于 2019-6-5 13:00 | 显示全部楼层
3431 发表于 2019-6-5 12:53
有些话是有目的性的 没事把核试验的话挑出来说 从近年来的情况看或许是美国在为退出条约做准备。

真正的重点在这里:
1、天朝核试验场还在积极使用中??爆炸屏蔽装置已经能躲避地震仪了?
2、中俄影响了联合国对“合法”次临界试验的定义
3、天朝的弹头设计(至少是初级设计)有可能还在继续进步

这三条都挺爆炸性的。。

US Government information indicates that China is possibly preparing to operate its test site year-round, a development that speaks directly to China’s growing goals for its nuclear forces. Further, China continues to use explosive containment chambers at its nuclear test site and Chinese leaders previously joined Russia in watering down language in a P5 statement that would have affirmed a uniform understanding of “zero-yield” testing. The combination of these facts and China’s lack of transparency on their nuclear testing activities raise questions as to whether China could achieve such progress without activities inconsistent with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
东方红 发表于 2019-6-5 13:04 来自航空航天港手机版! | 显示全部楼层
zhutou6 发表于 2019-6-5 12:57
FAS的Hans M. Kristensen看不下去了,亲自出马打脸DIA一贯吹牛扯淡的历史业绩...
请问DIA拿了那么多经费 ...

美国人的预测还是相当准确的。要是按照上世纪八十年代中期的生产规模,确实如第一条直线所描述,可是后来很快军转民了。第二条直线惊人的准确。第三条直线则过于保守,估计是害怕把美国老百姓吓坏了,不好交代。
拓跋尊 发表于 2019-6-5 13:13 | 显示全部楼层
从军改后火箭军编制的巨大扩编来看(包括增加导弹旅和导弹旅本身内部编制的增加),美国的预测是正确的
3431 发表于 2019-6-5 13:23 | 显示全部楼层
zhutou6 发表于 2019-6-5 13:00
真正的重点在这里:
1、天朝核试验场还在积极使用中??爆炸屏蔽装置已经能躲避地震仪了?
2、中俄影响 ...

实验场一直都有人 这是公开的秘密 这三条确定不是为自己搞实验开脱?
3431 发表于 2019-6-5 13:24 | 显示全部楼层
拓跋尊 发表于 2019-6-5 13:13
从军改后火箭军编制的巨大扩编来看(包括增加导弹旅和导弹旅本身内部编制的增加),美国的预测是正确的

扩编的很大一部分是常规导弹部队吧。
supsauce 发表于 2019-6-5 13:24 来自航空航天港手机版! | 显示全部楼层
zhutou6 发表于 2019-6-5 13:00
真正的重点在这里:
1、天朝核试验场还在积极使用中??爆炸屏蔽装置已经能躲避地震仪了?
2、中俄影响 ...

弹头设计进步我觉得情理之中吧,九院这些年完全没闲着,项目可以说应有尽有
拓跋尊 发表于 2019-6-5 13:26 | 显示全部楼层
3431 发表于 2019-6-5 13:24
扩编的很大一部分是常规导弹部队吧。

错了,常规就没咋扩,我在鼎盛写过一篇火箭军导弹旅的分析文章,后来鼎盛改版,没了
3431 发表于 2019-6-5 13:29 | 显示全部楼层
supsauce 发表于 2019-6-5 13:24
弹头设计进步我觉得情理之中吧,九院这些年完全没闲着,项目可以说应有尽有

关键是不搞全量实验也没法百分之百保证它肯定能用啊。
3431 发表于 2019-6-5 13:30 | 显示全部楼层
拓跋尊 发表于 2019-6-5 13:26
错了,常规就没咋扩,我在鼎盛写过一篇火箭军导弹旅的分析文章,后来鼎盛改版,没了

文章有备份吗?
拓跋尊 发表于 2019-6-5 13:34 | 显示全部楼层
3431 发表于 2019-6-5 13:30
文章有备份吗?

可能有些朋友会有,我自己写的,当然不用了
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